The Spectrum Sharing in Cognitive Radio Networks Based on Competitive Price Game
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The competitive price game model is used to analyze the spectrum sharing problem in the cognitive radio networks, and the spectrum sharing problem with the constraints of available spectrum resource from primary users is further discussed in this paper. The Rockafeller multiplier method is applied to deal with the constraints of available licensed spectrum resource, and the improved profits function is achieved, which can be used to measure the impact of shared spectrum price strategies on the system profit. However, in the competitive spectrum sharing problem of practical cognitive radio network, primary users have to determine price of the shared spectrum without the acknowledgement of the other primary user’s price strategies. Thus a fast gradient iterative calculation method of equilibrium price is proposed, only with acknowledgement of the price strategies of shared spectrum during last cycle. Through the adaptive iteration at the direction with largest gradient of improved profit function, the equilibrium price strategies can be achieved rapidly. It can also avoid the predefinition of adjustment factor according to the parameters of communication system in conventional linear iteration method. Simulation results show that the proposed competitive price spectrum sharing model can be applied in the cognitive radio networks with constraints of available licensed spectrum, and it has better convergence performance.
Document typePeer reviewed
Document versionFinal PDF
SourceRadioengineering. 2012, vol. 21, č. 3, s. 802-808. ISSN 1210-2512
- 2012/3