Event corruption: A game theoretic approach

dc.contributor.authorHaugen, Kjetil K.
dc.contributor.authorSolberg, Harry A.
dc.coverage.issue2cs
dc.coverage.volume7cs
dc.date.accessioned2019-01-16T08:47:57Z
dc.date.available2019-01-16T08:47:57Z
dc.date.issued2018cs
dc.description.abstractThis article applies economics of doping theory (game theory) to corrup- tion. Similarities and significant differences between the two topics are identified. As a consequence of such differences, the corruptive action – the bribe – is introduced as a decision variable for the players. Nash equilibria of the “corruption game” are structurally similar to the doping situation – e.g. “everybody is corrupt”. However, the size of the bribe becomes, as a consequence of a significant revision of the basic models, “as high as possible”; indicating that the event corruption case should be at least as hard to handle as the doping problem and with possibly even more drastic adverse effects. Although the article focuses on corruption in sports and events, the results are also relevant for other types of corruptive action. Corruption in sports is a problem threatening the existence of professional sports. Hence, the methods for better understanding presented in this article are of vital importance for the professional sports business.en
dc.formattextcs
dc.format.extent139-154cs
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.identifier.citationMathematics for Applications. 2018 vol. 7, č. 2, s. 139-154. ISSN 1805-3629cs
dc.identifier.doi10.13164/ma.2018.12en
dc.identifier.issn1805-3629
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11012/137318
dc.language.isoencs
dc.publisherVysoké učení technické v Brně, Fakulta strojního inženýrství, Ústav matematikycs
dc.relation.ispartofMathematics for Applicationsen
dc.relation.urihttp://ma.fme.vutbr.cz/archiv/7_2/ma_7_2_haugen_solberg_final.pdfcs
dc.rights© Vysoké učení technické v Brně, Fakulta strojního inženýrství, Ústav matematikycs
dc.rights.accessopenAccessen
dc.subjectprimary 91A10en
dc.subject91A40; secondary 91en
dc.titleEvent corruption: A game theoretic approachen
dc.type.driverarticleen
dc.type.statusPeer-revieweden
dc.type.versionpublishedVersionen
eprints.affiliatedInstitution.departmentÚstav matematikycs
eprints.affiliatedInstitution.facultyFakulta strojního inženýrstvícs
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