Event corruption: A game theoretic approach
Loading...
Date
2018
Authors
ORCID
Advisor
Referee
Mark
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Vysoké učení technické v Brně, Fakulta strojního inženýrství, Ústav matematiky
Altmetrics
Abstract
This article applies economics of doping theory (game theory) to corrup- tion. Similarities and significant differences between the two topics are identified. As a consequence of such differences, the corruptive action – the bribe – is introduced as a decision variable for the players. Nash equilibria of the “corruption game” are structurally similar to the doping situation – e.g. “everybody is corrupt”. However, the size of the bribe becomes, as a consequence of a significant revision of the basic models, “as high as possible”; indicating that the event corruption case should be at least as hard to handle as the doping problem and with possibly even more drastic adverse effects. Although the article focuses on corruption in sports and events, the results are also relevant for other types of corruptive action. Corruption in sports is a problem threatening the existence of professional sports. Hence, the methods for better understanding presented in this article are of vital importance for the professional sports business.
Description
Keywords
Citation
Mathematics for Applications. 2018 vol. 7, č. 2, s. 139-154. ISSN 1805-3629
http://ma.fme.vutbr.cz/archiv/7_2/ma_7_2_haugen_solberg_final.pdf
http://ma.fme.vutbr.cz/archiv/7_2/ma_7_2_haugen_solberg_final.pdf
Document type
Peer-reviewed
Document version
Published version
Date of access to the full text
Language of document
en
Study field
Comittee
Date of acceptance
Defence
Result of defence
Document licence
© Vysoké učení technické v Brně, Fakulta strojního inženýrství, Ústav matematiky